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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
THE OWNERSHIP OF PETROLEUbf OIL AND
NATURAL GAS IN PLACE.*
By D. EDWVARD GREER.**
It has always been the boast of common-law lawyers that the
system was so flexible and adaptable to new conditions that it
afforded an adequate remedy in any ease or state of facts, however
novel and complicated. This claim has been put to a severe test
in determining the rights of the owner of land to petroleum oil and
natural gas underlying the same. At first the courts established
the obvious proposition that these substances are minerals, since
the term "minerals" embraces all inorganic substances in or under
the surface of the earth; and hence it was argued that any such
component parts of the surface, or underlying strata, were parts
of the laud; and that any disposition thereof would be a disposition
of a part of the land. Therefore, it was held that an ordinary lease
of the land did not authorize the extraction of oil therefrom; that
an executor, having power to lease, could not grant power to extract
oil; that a guardian could not make an oil lease or contract giving
the right to extract these substances.' So a reservation of all "min-
erals" operated to reserve oil and gas, unless there was some-
thing in the deed showing an intention not to include these sub-
stances in the term "minerals," or the surrounding circumstances
showed such intention.2 Having so determined, it was an easy con-
clusion, if no consideration was given to the peculiar attributes
of these substances, that they belonged absolutely to the owner
of the land, since the land owner's title extended ad caelum ad
inferno.3 Another corollary was drawn that since the right of
* Reprinted by permission from Vol. 1, Tex s LAW REVIEW.
** Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas.
Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, 68 Hans. 691, 75 Pac. 995 (1904) ; Isom v. Rex
Crude Oil Co., 147 Cal. 659, 82 Pac. 317 (1905); Stoughton's Appeal 88 Pa. 198
(1878) ; Williamson ,. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 19 S. E. 436 (1894) ; Murray v. Allard,
100 Tenn. 100, 43 S. W. 355(1897) ; Suit v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63-W. Va. 317, 61
S. E. 307 (1908).
2 Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. St. 36, 47 Am. Rep. 696 (1882) Right of Way
Co. v. Gladys City, etc., 106 Tex. 94, 51 L, R. A. (NS) 268 (1913) Deltor v. Hol-
land, 57 Ohio St. 492, 49 N. E. 690 (1898) ; Suit v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va.
317, 61 S. E. 307 (1908).
' Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S. E. 411 (1897) ; Wilson v,. Youst, 43
W. Va. 826. 28 S. E. 781 (1897) ; Isom v. Rex Crude Oil Co., szpra; Lanyon Zinc
Co. v. Freeman, 68 Kans. 691, 75 Pac. 995 (1904).
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disposition was inherently incident to full ownership, the land-
owner had the power and right to convey the substances separate
and apart from the surface.' The doctrine of horizontal severance
or partition was invoked (established as to solid minerals) and
made to apply to these substances. This line of reasoning, how-
ever, was not allowed to go unchallenged and among the early de-
cisions are some which question it and seek to point out its fallacy,
and indeed, hold that, notwithstanding these substances are miin-
erals, owing to their peculiar nature they are incapable of owner-
ship in situ.5  It was shown in these early cases that there was a
very substantial and radical difference between oil and gas and
solid minerals, in that the former had, or were assumed to have, the
power of moving from place to place-of migrating, so to speak,
from one tract of land to another, and that by such movement
the title of one land owner, if he had any, was lost without his
consent and against his will.0 Now, since such condition was
entirely inconsistent with the legal concept of true or absoluite own-
ership, the question of such ownership was raised and has been
debated by the courts ever since with somewhat varying and con-
flicting conclusions. The title of the land owner was compared,
by those courts taking the view that oil and gas are migratory,
with his title to wild animals (ferac ilaturac) that came on his
land; and while the analogy was admitted to be incomplete it was
insisted that the land owner's title was much more like his title
to wild animals than like his title to solid minerals. 7  Likewise, the
earliest cases held that the title of the land owner to oil and gas was
entirely similar to his title to running or percolating water under
the surface of his land; that the extent of the right in either case,
percolating water or oil and gas, was the exclusive right to capture,
to take and to use such minerals while on or under his land. The
right as to wild animals was known at common law as ratione soli;
and the right to take water practically the same. This was declared
4 Preston v. White. 57 W. Va. 27S, 50 S. E. 236 (1906).
3 Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. 164, (1867) ; Wood Co. Pet. Co. v;. West Virginia, Etc.,
Co., 28 W. Va. 210 (1886).
6 Dark v. Johnston, supra; Westmoreland, Etc. Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 325, (1889)
Wood Co. Pet. Co. v. West Va. Etc. Co., supra; Brown v. Spilman, 155 U. S. 665
(1895).
" Schulte v. Warren. 218 Il. 108, 75 N. E. 786 (1905) ; Westmoreland, Etc. Co.
v. DeWitt, supra; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1900) ; State v. Ohio Oil
Co., 150 Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 809 (1898).
In Wood Co. Pet. Co. -v. West Virginia, Etc. Co., note 5, supra, a curious result was
reached. Defendant had a lease allowing him to drill wells for oil only. In drilling
for oil he found gas of commercial value which he sold-the gas coming out with
oil. The court held that the lessor had no cause of action for the value of the
gas as he did not own it in place, and as the lessee was lawfully in possession he
had the title to the gas.
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to be the extent of the right possessed as to oil and gas Of course
such right falls far short of the rights of an owner, or ownership,
and under this view no conveyance transferring title or reserving
title could be made. Likewise, it was pointed out, that from the
conclusion that oil and gas are minerals, it does not follow that the
land owner owns them, because percolating underground water
is conceded on all bands to be a mineral, and yet it is universally
held that the land owner does not own such water' but only has the
exclusive right on his land to capture and take possession of such
water and thus acquire title thereto; he cannot convey it or reserve
it distinct from the surface, because he does not own it.
Again, the doctrine of ad caelumn ad inferno does not give to a
riparian owner, title to water passing over one's land in a stream,
notwithstanding he owns the fee to the center of the stream; nor to
shell fish, mollusks or oysters not planted by the land owner. L
These considerations were sufficient in the minds of many of the
courts, and perhaps a majority of them, to upset the whole theory
of absolute ownership of petroleum oil and natural gas in place.
Just here it may be well to say that perhaps the courts went too
far in assuming that these substances possessed the power of self-
propulsion and movement in a state of nature. Such fact has not
been and never could be proven; but the general belief among prac-
tical operators and geologists now is that these substances, gener-
ally speaking, have been confined for ages in pools, porous rocks,
and sands where we now find them, and would so remain for ages
to come if not allowed to escape or move by an earthquake breaking
up the stratum, or some similar occurrence, or by the act of man
in drilling into the pool, sand or rock. Evidently an earthquake
of sufficient violence to shatter the containing rocks and leave
crevices in adjacent rocks would cause the oil and gas to move to
a lower, or even to a higher level, owing to the pressure of the gas;
but probably courts would, and should, take no account of such an
extraordinary, unusual and improbable occurrence in determining
the ownership of these substances in place. However this may be,
it is conceded on all hands by practical operators and geologists
Wood Co. Pet Co. v. West Virginia T., Etc. Co., 28 W. Va., 210 (1886) ; Dark v.
Johnston, 55 Pa. 164 (1857) ; Westmoreland, Etc. Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 325
(1889) ; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1900).
9 Dark v. Johnson, 55 Pa. 164 (1867) ; TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY, § 342;
BARNUm ON11 WATEES, § 944; Hudson Co. Water Co. v. McCarter, 70 N. J. Eq. 605,
65 At]. 489, (1906).
2o Gratz v. McKee, 270 Fed. 713 (1920) (C. C. A. 8th Cir.) and the many cases
cited.
Those authorities show It to be an established proposition that if a trespasser on
land captures or kills wild game, fish, etc., the title of the land owner is thereby
perfected to them.
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that oil and gas will move to an opening into the pool or stratum
and through such opening-the substances being always found un-
der pressure; and hence by drilling a well on his own land, one
can get possession of oil or gas which was under his neighbor's
land, and thereby secure the title to the same. When the natural
pressure is not sufficient, the oil and gas can be drawn by pumps
from under another's land, and thus its sits changed from one
tract to another; also by exploding dynamite in wells, the process
being known as "shooting the well."
Aside from the belief of practeial operators and geologists that
oil and gas will move from their location in the earth to an opening
made in the containing stratum by a well, it can be mathematically
demonstrated that such is the fact. The ordinary oil or gas well
is begun with a hole 10 inches in diameter. As the well gets deeper
smaller pipe is inserted and the well is usually finished, when it is
of any considerable depth, with a four-inch pipe. The oil sand or
rock is rarely more than 100 feet thick. Hence all the oil or gas
which lies immediately under the four-inch pipe forming the bottom
of the well, is contained in a cylinder four inches in diameter by
100 feet long. Such a cylinder contains approximately 115 gallons
capacity, or about 2.74 barrels. So, if more fluid comes out of the
well than 115 gallons, some of it necessarily comes from strata ly-
ing adjacent to the prolonged cylinder. Suppose a well produces
10,000 barrels of oil per day; all of this except 2.74 barrels neces-
sarily comes from the strata adjacent to the prolonged cylinder of
the well pipe. Now suppose the well is drilled with its center on
the dividing line of two land owners. It is perfectly apparent that
one-half of the oil produced comes from each tract. If the center
of the well is one foot from the line, not quite half comes from each
tract. So, for any distance from the dividing line that the oil or
gas will move to the opening, some part of it comes from each tract.
Let us assume that oil will flow to an opening only 400 feet. Then
a well drilled 400 feet from a division line will draw no oil from
the adjacent tract. But suppose a well is drilled 200 feet from
the line-it is apparent that such well will draw that proportion of
its total production from the adjacent tract which the area of the
segment of the circle drawn around the well with a 400-foot radius
which falls in the adjacent tract, is of the total area of the circle.
In the above calculation we have assumed the thickness of the oil-
bearing sand or rock at 100 feet, and treated it as if all was oil.
Now, it is rare that the sand is more than fifty feet thick and the
degree of saturation is rarely more than 20 per cent-that is, of a
4
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a given bulk of the oil sand only 20 per cent of such is oil. Suppose
a well, four-inch diameter at the bottom, has a producing sand fifty
feet thick with a saturation of twenty per cent. Suppose such a
well in its lifetime produces 100,000 barrels of oil. A calculation
will show that this well drains all of the oil from a circle of 374
feet in diameter, or for a distance in every direction from its cen-
ter of 187 feet, or will drain an area of 2.6 acres.
These established facts are entirely sufficient to throw grave
doubt on the title of the land owner to these substances while under
his land. Indeed, just as much doubt as if the assumption of self-
propulsion was an established fact. Therefore, the fact that the
assumption of self-migration may be erroneous does not aid us in a
solution of the question of the ownership of these substances while
in place.
Assuming, then, a condition which is admitted to exist on all
hands, and which is demonstrably true, towit, that the oil and gas
underlying A's land may be withdrawn therefrom by the drilling
of a well on B's land, and that B acquires full and complete title
to such oil or gas when lie brings it to the surface through a well
drilled on his land, the question is, what is the character of title
which A had to the oil before it was withdrawn? And, if it is
contended that he had full and complete ownership, how can his
title be lost in harmony with recognized legal principles, without
his consent and against his will?"'
We cannot conclude that the land owner has not title to oil and
gas in situ because he has not such title to wild animals, or to per-
colating underground water, because it must be conceded that there
are substantial differences between the land owner's dominion
over wild animals which come at will on his land and leave when
they please, and oil and gas in place, and percolating water. The
title to wild animals, before capture, is in the public or state at
large, subject to be vested in the land owner on capture or reduc-
tion to possession; whereas the title to oil and gas is not in the pub-
lie but is, in the view of some courts, in the land owners in common
whose lands cover or overlie the pool or producing rock or sand
containing the oil, subject to being individualized or perfected by
reduction to actual possession by each. This is the view taken by
the Federal or Supreme Court both as to oil and gas and as to the
21 See article by Dr. J. W. Simonton in 27 W. VA. L. Qu, . 332, for philosophical
discussion of this question. Also article by Dr. W. L. Summers in 4 ILL. L. QUAR. 12.
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mineral water at Saratoga Springs, New York.12 The theory was
also adopted by the New York Court of Appeals as to underlying
percolating water, and one land owner was successfully enjoined
from taking water from his own land by means of powerful pumps
for the purpose of selling the same to a city, on the ground that the
result of such operation was to prevent the rise of underground
water to the surface of adjacent lands and thus render them bar-
ren. 13 There is another difference between oil and gas in place and
percolating water, and that is in the case of water the supply
is replenished by surface rains, the water finding its way to the
subterranean sands and thus there is more or less a continuation
of the supply and not a permanent complete exhaustion by the
extraction of the water. This is also true of wild animals, of
course, since after some are captured others come. So far as
known, this is not true of oil or gas. There is no steady, constant
supply, and when the oil in the sand, rock or pool, as the case may
be, is once exhausted, it will probably never be replaced. This
replenishing or renewal condition, however, is not supposed to be
true as to the carbonated waters at Saratoga Springs, New York,
and the rule was applied there that the ownership of these waters
was in all the land owners owning the surface overlying the
same. 4 Moreover, the fact that ordinary percolating underground
waters are replendished from rains on the surface, is not of much
practical importance, since the land owner can, by excavating large
reservoirs on his land, stop the flow of these waters and thereby de-
prive the owner of adjacent land of such flow and take for himself
all such waters. This it is generally held he may do, and his act as
to the adjacent proprietor is damnum absque injuria. The differ-
ences, therefore, between the dominion of the surface owner over
wild animals, percolating underground water and oil and gas,
though important and considerable, do not seem to be sufficient
to put oil and gas in a class entirely by themselves, and to make
different rules of law applicable to the ownership of such sub-
stances from those applicable to wild animals and percolating
water. Indeed, the differences between the dominion of the sur-
face owner over wild animals which come on his land, and under-
02 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1900) ; Walls v. Midland Carbon Co.
254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. Ct. 118 (1920) ; Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U. S. 61 (1911) ; Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 194 N: Y. 326, 87 N. E.
504 (1909).
23 Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644 (1900). See also
Gagnon v. French, Etc. Springs Co., 163 Ind. 687, 72 N. E. 849 (1904); Katz v.
Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663 (1902).
14 Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., note 12, supra.
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ground percolating water, are greater than the differences between
such dominion over water on the one hand and oil and gas on the
other. As before stated, the title to wild animals is in the state
or the public at large before capture; whereas the title to percolat-
ing underground water is never in the state or public at large. The
one common attribute of all three of these classes is that title may
be acquired lawfully by a person other than the owner of the
land where sutch substances for the time are situated or abide,
by inducing or causing a movement thereof by an adjacent owner
to his land. Also the rule that the land owner has the exclusive
right to take such substances, reduce them to possession and there-
by acquire title while they are on his land, is applicable to all three;
and any one going on the land of another and reducing any of
these things to possession there, is a trespasser and he acquires
no title to them; but the reduction to possession by such trespasser
perfects the title in the land owner.
If A goes on to B's land and captures or kills wild animals or
birds, such birds or animals belong to B. If he goes on B's land
and drills a well and brings water to the surface, such water be-
longs to B. If he goes on B's land, drills a well and brings oil or
gas to the surface, such oil or gas belongs to B; but if A entices
wild animals away from B's land, in any way not constituting a
trespass, on to his own land and there captures them, they belong
to A. So if he excavates a reservoir on his land and thereby en-
traps and causes a flow of underground water from B's land to his
own, it belongs to him; also if he drills an oil or gas well on his land
and oil or gas which was under B's land comes up through his well,
he has full title thereto. Substantially, therefore, it would appear
that the rules of law governing the title as to wild animals, perco-
lating underground water and oil and gas, should be the same,
notwithstanding the different attributes of these things above
pointed out.
The true and absolute test of the ownership of a thing on all
sound legal principles, must be whether the party claiming such
ownership has such right or title to the thing that no one can
lawfully take it from him without his consent. If this rule is made
the test, then unquestionably a land owner has no ownership of
the oil and gas underlying his land. It is demonstrable, as above
shown, that the land owner loses all semblance of the title to oil and
gas which were under his land if they come to the surface through
a well drilled by his neighbor on his land. He can not enjoin or
stop the drilling of such well, no matter how evident it is that some
7
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part of the production of that well is from oil and gas underlying
his land, nor can he sustain any claim for damages for such act. 5
As previously indicated, the courts seem to be in disagreement
on the question of ownership of oil and gas in place, though in the
opinion of the writer the weight of authority is in favor of the
doctrine of non-ownership. The Federal Supreme Court is entirely
committed to the doctrine, and, of course, that great tribunal has
much weight in all jurisdictions.'6 As might be expected, since the
Supreme Court holds to this doctrine, the lower Federal Courts
likewise maintain the doctrine of non-ownership. 17  The doctrine
of non-ownership is settled in Indiana, 18 Kentucky,1 9 Oklahoma,20
Louisiana,21 Illinois, 22 New York
23 and Ohio.2 4
The contrary doctrine seems to have been adopted in Tennessee
at an early date, but in a case which was not given very much
consideration.25 In that case it appeared that A, the owner of the
land, conveyed the same to B, reserving to the grantor all mines,
minerals and metals in and under the land. The title came to D
through deeds containing no reservation of minerals. C, at judicial
sale, purchased whatever interest A had by virtue of the reserva-
tion in the original deed, and contest was between C and D as to
who had the legal right in the oil and gas under the land. The
court held that C had such rights, and in a brief opinion said:
"In addition it is well settled that one person may own the
surface or soil and another the minerals and mines and mteals,
and even the water and there may be different owners for the
several different strata under the earth."
is Even in West Virginia, where the court seems to hold to the doctrine of abso-
lute ownership, this fact Is recognized. Coffindaffer v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 74
W. Va. 107, 81 S. E. 966 (1914) ; South Penn oil Co. v. Haught, 71 W. Va. 720,
78 S. E. 759 (1913).
16 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1900) ; walls v. Midland Carbon Co.,
254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. CL 118 (1920) ; Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U. S. 61 (1911); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229, 55 L. Ed.
725 (1911).
17 Priddy v. Thompson, 123 C. C. A. 282, 204 Fed. 955 (1913) ; Lindley v. Ray-
dure, 239 Fed. 928 (1917), affirmed in 249 Fed. 675 (1918), and cases there
collected.
18 Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. 19 (1897) ; State v. Ohio Oil Co..
150 Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 809 (1898).
15 Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S. W. 368 (1903)
Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 132 Ky. 435, 111 S. W. 374 (1908).
'0 Rich v. Doneghey, 177 Pac. 86 (1918), wherein a long list of Oklahoma cases
is cited.
Z Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sallings, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1920), in which
all the cases in Louisiana are reviewed, and the court states emphatically that the
non-ownership doctrine Is established in that State; see also Frost-Johnson Lum-
ber Co. v. Nabors, Etc. 149 La. 100, 88 So. 723 (1920).
2 Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill 9, 84 N. E. 53 (1908) ; Poe V. Ulery,
233 Il. 56, 84 N. E. 46 (1908).
= Shepherd v. McCalmont Oil Co., 38 Hun. 37 (1885) ; Hathorn v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., 23 L. R. A. (NS) 437 (1909) ; Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N. Y. 609,
62 N. E. 584 (1902).
Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N. E. 399 (1897).
Murray %,. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S. W. 355 (1897).
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It is apparent that it was not necessary for the court to hold
that C acquired legal title to the oil and gas in place, because if C
acquired whatever rights A had reserved in the original convey-
ance, he acquired the exclusive right to go on the land and
take all of the oil and gas, whether such substances are suscepti-
ble of ownership or not. Thus, it is held distinctly in the Louisi-
ana Case, Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling, supra, that a
reservation of all the oil and gas in a tract of land has the effect
of reserving a right to take such oil and gas though it does not
have the effect of reserving any title to any part of the land. The
Tennessee court was evidently misled by the analogy of solid min-
erals. I have not been able to find that the question has again
risen in Tennessee, but it is reasonable to suppose that in the light
of later decisions this court would not hold to the bald doctrine
aniounced in the case of Murray v. Allard.
Perhaps the State of Kansas can properly be ranged on the side
of those states holding to the doctrine of ownership of oil and
gas in place. In the case of Moore v. Griffin,2" Murray v. Allard
was relied upon by the court in holding that the reservation of the
oil and gas reserved the title to such substances, the court using this
language:
"Different estates may be created in the surface and soil of
lands and the underlying starata in which minerals, oils and
gas may be found; and this separation of estates may be accom-
plished by an exception in the deed conveying the lands by which
the grantor carves out and retains the right to the minerals in
the land. The right retained by the exception is the ownership
of the minerals."
Here, again, it was entirely unnecessary for the court to hold
that the exception amounted to a reservation of the title to the
minerals in place. Indeed, the reservation, as quoted by the
court in the opinion, reserves, first, "all of the rights, privileges
and benefits secured to the grantor under an oil and gas lease"
which he had executed, in other words, reserving royalty in such
a lease, and in the second place it recited, that "it is intended
hereby to reserve all oil and gas privileges in and to said prem-
ises." So that as a matter of fact, the reservation was not an
attempt to reserve title to minerals in place, and the decision of
the court that such minerals can be owned, or are owned, by the
land owner, is a pure dictum. It is more than probable that upon
' Moore v. Griffin, 72 Hans. 164, 83 Pac. 395 (1905).
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subsequent review of the precise question in both Tennessee and in
Kansas the court will do as the Louisiana court has done, where
the two cases, Do Moss v. Sample,"7 and Calhoun v. Ardis,2 were
distinguished from prior cases holding to the doctrine of non-
ownership and were held to be not in conflict with such doctrine, in
the later cases of Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Nabors Oil Co., and
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling.29 The De Moss-Sample and
Calhoun-Ardis Cases are almost as strong in expressions in favor
of ownership by the land owner as are the expressions in the Ten-
nessee and Kansas cases. For instance, in the former case it was
said by the court:
"Oil and gas in place are minerals, and they fall under these
principles. Therefore when the Samples, in the deed to De
Moss, reserved tlhe oil and gas and mineral rights, the owner-
ship of these things remained as they had been before, vested
in them. DeMoss is the owner of the surface and the Sam-
ples are the owners of the oil and gas, as separate property
from the surface. It makes no difference that the oil and gas
are fluent and wandering for the present question."
Notwithstanding this declaration, the Supreme Court of Lou-
isiana, in the subsequent case of Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v.
Salling, emphatically declared that the decision in the Do Moss
Case was not intended to, and did not, overrule prior cases hold-
ing that oil and gas in place were not susceptible of ownership,
and did not belong to the owner of the land.
Therefore, I say that the Supreme Courts of Tennessee and
Kansas can, with just as good grace, explain that they did not
mean to hold to the doctrine of absolute ownership of these sub-
stances in the mentioned cases, and, therefore, join the majority
in the non-ownership doctrine.
Arkansas is claimed by the advocates of the absolute ownership
theory to be on their side of the controversy, and the case of
Osborne v. Arkasas Territorial Oil Co.,3" is cited in support of
such claims. It must be admitted that expressions oi the court in
argument indicate, within the opinion of the judge who wrote the
decision, such substances can be, and are, owned by the land
owner. What was really decided, however, and all that was
decided, was that purchases of the fee from the lessor of spe-
" 143 La. 243, 78 So. 482 (1918).
t 144 La. 311, 80 So. 548 (1918).
19 Note 20, supra.
10 103 Ark. 175, 146 S. W. 122 (1932).
10
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cific parts of the leased land are entitled to the royalties from
wells drilled on their specific tracts. The facts were that A,
the owner of a tract of land, leased it for the production of oil
and gas; subsequently he sold the leased land in three separate
parcels to three separate purchasers. Gas was produced from one
of these parcels. The purchaser of such parcel claimed all the
rental and the other purchasers claimed that the rental should
be apportioned. The court held that it should not be apportioned
but should all be paid to the purchaser of the specific tract. The
court relies largely in its decision upon the case of Northwestern
Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. Ullery, "I and yet as has been shown in
the preceding part of this paper, Ohio is one of the states
which holds to the doctrine of non-ownership. The doctrine
of non-ownership is also throughly established in Oklahoma, 3*-
and yet that court holds to the doctrine of non-apportionment
of rents and royalties, just as does the Arkansas court."
This doctrine of non-apportionment of royalties is also up-
held in Indiana, 34 notwithstanding, as has been shown, the
non-ownership doctrine is firmly established in that State.
It would, therefore, seem that the absolute-ownership doctrine is
not established in Arkansas, but that the question is open in that
State.
As to California, I have been unable to find any decision on
the subject, one way or the other. That court has held, construing
their code, that a leasehold interest in oil or gas lands is taxable;
but this, it is believed, is due to the fact that their Civil Code
makes and such interest in land taxable, whether it is a title or
not.3 " It was held in this case that the lease before the court
did not pass any title to the minerals in place, hence the decision
that the leasehold is taxable was not a decision on the question of
ownership of oil and gas in place. Likewise, in Kentucky, a lease-
hold is held taxable under the statutes of that State,3" though the
doctrine of non-ownership is established in that State. So, in
Illinois, a leasehold is taxable under the statute of that State,
though the doctrine of non-ownership is fully established there.
3 7
As to Pennsylvania, the question is perhaps still in doubt,
21 68 Ohio St. 259, 67 N. E. 494 (1903).
- See cases cited in note 17, supra.
" Kimberly v. Luckey, 179 Pac. 928 (Okla. 1919).
Fairbanks v. Warren, 56 Ind. App. 337, 104 N. E. 983 (1914).
Graciosa Oil Co. -v. Santa Barbara County, 155 Cal. 140, 99 Pac. 483 (1909).
38 Wolfe County v. Beckett, 127 Ky. 252, 105 S. W. 447 (1907).
*7 People v. Bell, 237 I1. 167, 86 N. E. 593 (1908), and cases cited In note
21, supra.
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strange to say, though the doctrine of non-ownership was ap-
proved in the earlier cases, and the now-celebrated comparison
of the ownership of these substances in place with the qualified
ownership of wild animals was first made by the Supreme Cburt
of that State. Later decisions seem to indicate a reversal of
the doctrine and a tendency to hold that such substances are
owned by the owner of the land. In the earliest case in that
State, Dark v. Johnston,"' decided in 1867, it is said:
"But if it be conceded that by the contract there was a grant
of the oil, it by no means follows from that alone that ejectment
is maintainable. Oil is a fluid, like water, it is not the subject
of property except while in actual occupancy. A grant of water
has long been considered not to be a grant of anything for which
an ejectment will lie. It is not a grant of the soil upon which
the water rests, Coke-Littleton, 4, V. It would confound all
legal notions were it held that an action can be maintained for
the recovery specifically of the possession of a subterranean
spring or stream of water, no matter whether the waters are.
mineral or not. There is a manifest difference between a grant
of all the coal or ore within a tract of land, or even the grant
of an exclusive right to dig, take and carry away all the coal in
the tract, and a grant of the waters in or on the tract. The
nature of the subject has much to with the rights that are given
over it, and to us it appears thata right to take all the oil that
may be found in a tract of land, cannot be a corporeal right.''"
It was in the case of Westmoreland Gas Co. v. De l1itt," that
the analogy between the title to wild animals and natural gas and
oil was first referred to. In this case it is said:
"Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed
by themselves if the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals
ferae vaturae. In common with animals, and unlike other min-
erals, they have the power and tendency to escape without the
volition of the owner." 4'
In the comparatively late case of Kelly v. Keys,42 the doctrine
was reaffirmed that a grant of oil and gas in place did not convey
anything for which ejectment would lie-in other words, conveyed
nothing but an incorporeal hereditament and, therefore, no part
of the land. It is true that the instrument before the court was
a lease and not a property deed, but the court would evidently have
23 55 Pa. 164 (1867).
31 See also Thompson's Appeal, 101 Pa. 225 (1882).
40 Note 6, supra.
4 See also Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa. 451, 25 Atl. 732 (1893).
42 213 Pa. 296, 62 Atl. 911 (1906).
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held that a deed would have had no greater effect than the instru-
ment being construed by the court. Again, in the case of Jones v.
Forest Oil Co.,43 the court says:
"Wffe conclude that the property of the owner of the lands in
oil and gas is not absolute until it is actually within his grasp
and brought to the surface."
On the other hand, in the quite recent case of Handle v. Ghar-
ing," where the instrument before the court contained this clause:
"Excepting and reserving from the above all the oil and gas pro-
duced from said undivided one-fourth of the above tract of land,"
the court held that this was an exception in the grant, and that
after making the grant the grantor had the same title to the oil
and gas as he would have had in the coal and other minerals had
they been reserved. The court evidently did not have in mind the
distinction between the fluid minerals, oil and gas, and the solid
minerals, notwithstanding the same court has often referred to
such distinction. 45 Again, in the case of Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas
Co.,4" the court apparently holds that the land owner owns all the
oil and gas under his land, even though no wells have been drilled.
However, all that the court really decided was that where a tract
of land was leased for the purpose of allowing the tenant to pro-
duce oil and gas therefrom, such tenant had such a right or estate
in the land as would support an action of ejeetment, and this on
the ground that he had a lease on the land itself for a specific pur-
pose, and, of course, at common law ejeetment will lie by a lessee
to recover the possession of the leased premises. From the fore-
going I think that it may be said that the question is unsettled in
Pennsylvania, and that probably if the Supreme Court of that
State is required to decide the precise question, it will fall in line
with the Supreme Court of the United States, and the majority of
the oil states, in holding to the doctrine of non-ownership.
As to West Virginia, there is the same state of confusion as in
Pennsylvania. Space forbids any considerable review of the cases,
but a few to show the uncertainty of decision there will be cited.
In the case of Hall v. Vernon,47 it is said in the opinion:
"Oil and natural gas are minerals, in the view of the law;
but because of their peculiar attributes, they, as the subject of
43 44 Atl. 1074 (1900).
44 256 Pa. 121, 100 At!. 535 (1917).45 Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa. 451, 25 AtL. 732 (1893).'a 225 Pa. St. 338. 74 At. 207 (1909).
47 34 S. E. 764 (1899).
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property, differ from other minerals . . . Out of possession,
there is not property in them . . They are not capable of
distinct ownership in place, owing to their liability to escape
from the place where they may be temporarily confined with-
out necessarily any interference on the part of the owner of the
soil, or others claiming through him, under whose land they may
be found. Like water, they are not the subject of property, ex-
cept in actual occupancy, and a grant of them passes nothing for
which ejectment will lie . . . Oil and gas cannot, while in
the ground, like the solid minerals, be the subject of an estate
distinct from that in the soil. 'Barringer and Adams on Mfines,
p. 30. A grant. to the oil and gas passes nothing for which eject-
ment will lie. It is a right, not to the oil in the ground, but to
the oil the grantee may find.' Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. 164.
So the reservation of the oil and gas is not of the oil and gas in
the ground, but of the oil and gas the grantor or his assigns may
find and reduce to possession, with the exclusive right to search
therefor. Natural gas is incapable of being absolute property,
and is the subject of qualified property only."
4 8
In the case of Preston v. White,'0 it is held that the owner of
the land is the owner of the oil and gas in place, and no reference
is made to the above cases. The question before the court was
whether a reservation of all the oil and gas in the tract of land
created a severance and reserved title in the grantor so that the
oil and gas would be susceptible of conveyance separate and apart
from the surface. The court held that it did. In support of the
decision the court cites a number of cases relating only to solid
minerals, and at the end of the opinion makes this remarkable
statement: "The case of Ohio Oil Go. v. State of Indiana contains
nothing to the reverse." If it is meant that this case contains
nothing to the reverse of the doctrine of ownership of oil and gas
in place, it is manifestly a mistake. If the court meant to hold that
by the reservation the grantor retained practically all of the ben-
eficial or valuable right in the oil and gas, that is, the exclusive
right to reduce to possession on the land these substances, then the
statement might be true. Again, in the case of Ankrom v. Pitts-
burgh, etc. Gas Co.,'" the West Virgina court holds in line with
Ohio and Arkansas and Indiana, that a purchaser of a part of the
leased premises is entitled to all of the oil produced from such tract,
and in the argument, in support of this conclusion, states that the
48 In support of this the court cites the case of Wood Co. Petroleum Co. v. West
Virginia Transportation Co., 28 W. Va. 210, (1886) ; BARRINGER & ADAMS ON MINES,
p. 78, and Shepherd v. 0il Co., 38 Hun. 37 (1885).
40 67 W. Va. 278, 50 S. E. 236 (1906).
do 83 W. Va. 81, 97 S. E. 593 (1918).
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owner of the land is the owner of the oil and gas under the land;
but for reasons already stated, such decision might be correctly
made without reference to the question of the ownership of these
substances in place. As has been said in regard to the decisions in
Kansas and in Arkansas, the conclusion of the court in Preston v.
White could be upheld and be correct without the necessity of
holding to the absolute ownership doctrine. The reservation in
the instrument before the court was certainly of all of the right of
the land owner to operate for and produce the oil and gas on the
premises. This right could undoubtedly be reserved or excepted
from the conveyance, and, just as was held in Louisiana in the
Ardis Case, supra, could be exercised by the grantor or his assigns.
In Texas, prior to the decision in Texas Company v. Daugh-
erty,"' it seems to have been held that oil and gas in place were
not susceptible of ownership, but since the decision in that case it
must be conceded that, unless and until such decision is overruled,
the doctrine of absolute ownership is established in Texas.
In the case of Bender v. Brooks, 12 the Supreme 'Court by Mr.
Justice Brown, said:
"It is true that appellants, as owners of the land, had no spe-
cific title to the oil therein until it has been removed from the
earth. Costigan on Mining Law, p. 474, note 18; Kelly v. Ohio
Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317."
He quotes from the last mentioned case as follows:
"Petroleum oil is a mineral, and while in the earth it is 'Part of
the realty, and, should it move from place to place by percola-
tion or otherwise, it forms part of that tract of land in which it
tarries for the time being, and, if it moves to the next adjoining
tract, it becomes part and parcel of that tract, until it reaches a
well and is raised to the surface, and then for the first time it
becomes the subject of distinct ownership separate from the
realty, and becomes personal property, the property of the per-
son into whose well it came. And this is so whether the oil moves,
percolates, or exists in pool or deposits. In either event, it is
property of, and belongs to, the person who reacheg it by means
of a well, and severs it from the realty and converts it into
personalty."
I think I might say that under the decision in this case the pro-
fession generally considered that the non-ownership doctrine was
:1 107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (1915).
" 103 Tex. 329, 127 S. W. 168 (1910).
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established in Texas. It had been previously been held, in Oil
Company v. Teel," that an instrument which purported to trans-
fer oil and gas in place did not have that effect, but no reason was
given for it except that the instrument before the court was only an
option.
The Courts of Civil Appeals in Texas had held almost uniformly
that title did not pass to the minerals in place although apt words
of conveyance were used in such instruments.5"
Of course, since the decision in the Texas Company v. Daugherty
Case the courts of Civil Appeals in this State have felt themselves
bound to follow such decision."
It is true that the Courts of Civil Appeals have shown some re-
luctance in following the doctrine of absolute ownership, and have
seized on what appear to be very slight differences in the instru-
ment under construction, to decide that the title in the given case
did not pass. For instance, in Pierce-Fordyce Co. v. Woodrum,"
the words, "grant, bargain and sell" were followed by the two
words, "and lease," and it was held that the addition of these two
words prevented the title in the minerals from passing. In Mc-
Laughlin v. Brockf'1 it was held that an instrument using the
words, "granted, conveyed, demised, leased and let," was simply
a lease and not a deed. In Marnett Oil Co. v. Munsey, 8 it was
held that, notwithstanding the instrument purported to convey the
oil and gas in place for a valuable consideration and contained the
recital that it was not a franchise but a grant, just as in the Daugh-
erty Case, but also contained a provision that if the grantee did
not drill wells, the grantor should have the right to do so, the court
held that this was a lease and not a sale of the minerals. So, in
Leonard v. Caruthers,"9 it was held no title passed to the minerals
though apt words of conveyance were used and a large cash consid-
eration paid. In the case of Corsicana Petroleum Co. v. Owens,"'
the Supreme Court had under consideration a contract almost
exactly like that considered in the Daugherty Case, nevertheless the
court considered the instrument as a lease, not a deed, and held that
53 95 Tex. 586, 67 S. W. 545 (1902).
" Forney v. Ward, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 443, 62 S. W. 108 (1901) ; Hodges V. Brice,
32 Tex. Civ. App. 358, 74 S. W. 590 (1903) ; O'Neil v. Sun Co. 58 Tex. Civ. App. 167,
123 S. W. 172 (1909) ; Witherspoon v. Staley, 138 S. W. 1191 (Tex. 1911) ; Wither-
spoon -v. Staley, 156 S. AV. 557 (Tex. 1913).
z 'IIntlre v. Thompson, 210 S. W. 563 (Tex. 1919) ; Thomason v. Upshur Co.,
211 S. W. 325 (Tex. 1919) ; Jackson v. Pure Oil Co., 217 S. W. 959 (Tex. 1919);
Davis v. Texas Co., 232 S. V. 549 (Tex. 1921).
r 188 S. W. 245 (Tex. 1916).
57 225 S. W. 575 (Tex. 1920).
58 232 S. W. 867 (Tex. 1921).
sO 236 S. W. 194 (Tex. 1921).
c0 110 Tex. 568. 222 S. W. 154 (1920).
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the right of the lessee could be lost by abandonment, which, of
course, could not be if the legal title to the minerals had passed.
Notwithstanding the opinion in this case was rendered by Chief
Justice Phillips, who wrote the opinion in the Daugherty Case, no
reference is made to the Daugherty Case.
With all due respect, it is submitted that the decision in the
Daugherty Case is contrary to the overwhelming weight of author-
ity, and is unsound in principle and will be finally overruled, that
is, will be overruled in so far as such decision holds that oil and
gas in place are susceptible of grant or conveyance separate and
apart from the land.
I believe that the preceding discussion of the authorities demon-
strates ihat the weight of authority, not only numerically but con-
sidering the dignity of the courts, is against the doctrine of owner-
ship. Practically all the text writers are in accord on this
proposition.6'
In the Daugherty Case, Mr. Justice Phillips, after stating that,
if the effect of the instrument was but the creation of a franchise
or privilege to devote the land to a certain use and to appropriate
a portion of the oil and gas which might be discovered, it would
not pass title to the minerals in place, and the owner of such priv-
ilege would have no such interest in the land as would be subject to
taxation under the laws of Texas, makes this observation:
"We accordingly turn to an examination of the instruments
for the purpose of determining their legal effect. It will be ob-
served that they constitute no mere demise of the premises for
a given period, as in the case of an ordinary leasehold. Nor do
they amount simply to a grant of the right to prospect upon the
land for oil or gas and reduce those substances to possession
and ownership. They deal with the oil, gas and other minerals,
'in and under' the land as property, in the ground, capable of
ownership and subject to be conveyed, for, as such, in unmistak-
able terms they are 'granted, sold and conveyed' to the grantee
for a stated consideration acknowledged to have been paid, val-
uable in itself and independent of the royalties stipulated as
payable to the grantor in the event of the discovery of such min-
erals, or any obligation imposed upon the grantee to explore
for them. [It may be here remarked that the statement that the
instrument was granted on consideration independent of the
royalties, is a mistake of fact; the instrument really distinctly pro-
vided that the royalties to be paid were a part of the considera-
tion for the whole instrument.] . . . The rights of the grantee
e COSTIGAN ON MINING LAiv, p. 474; TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY, (2nd ed.) Vol.
1, p. 872;THORNTON ON OIL AND GAS, p. 1102; also §§ 20 and 22 p. 34.
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are made subject to forfeiture if operations for the drilling of a
well for oil or gas are not begun within one year from the deliv-
ery of the instrument, or if the payment of the amount provided
in lieu of such commencement is not made; but the sinldng of a
well or shaft and the discovery of any of the minerals named,
within the period of one year or the extension thereof provided
for, in each instance renders the instrument effective for twenty
years and as much longer as such minerals shall be produced in
paying quantities. This constituted the entire grant as one cap-
able of indefinite duration. . . . The grant amounted to a de-
feasible title in fee to the oil and gas in the ground, if oil and
gas in place are capable of ownership and conveyance."
The court then, by way of argument and reasons for holding
that such substances are capable of conveyance, states, first, that
"they are minerals;" that "they lie within the strata of the earth
and necessarily are a part of the realy;" that "being a part of the
realty while in place it would seem to logically follow that when-
ever they are conveyed while in that condition or possessing that
status, a conveyance of an interest in the realty results." The
court then states:
"It is generally conceded that for the purpose of ownership
and conveyance of solid minerals the earth may be divided hor-
izontally as well as vertically, and that title to the surface may
rest in one person and title to the strata beneath the surface con-
taining such minerals in another."
Then says:
"Because of the fugitive nature of oil and gas, some eburts,
emphasizing the doctrine that they are incapable of absolute ow-
nership until captured and reduced to possession and analogizing
their ownership to that of things ferae naturae, have made a dis-
tinction between their conveyance while in place and that of
other minerals, holding that it created no interest in the realty.
But it is difficult to perceive a substantial ground for the dis-
tinction. A purchaser of them within the ground assumes the
hazard of their absence through the possibility of their escape
from beneath that particular tract of land, and, of course, if they
are not discovered the conveyance is of no effect; just as the
purchaser of solid minerals within the ground incurs the risk of
its absence and therefore a futile venture. But let it be sup-
posed that they have not escaped, and are in repose within the
strata beneath the particular tract and capable of possession by
appropriation from it. There they clearly constitute a part of
the reality. Is the possibility of their escape to render them
while in place incapable of conveyance, or is their ownership
while in that condition, with the exclusive right to take them
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1923], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol29/iss3/4
VEST VIIGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
from the land, anything less than ownership of an iterest in the
land? Conceding that they are fluent in their nature and may
depart from the land before brought into absolute possession,
will it be denied that so long as they have not departed they are
a part of the land? Or when conveyed in their natural state and
they are in fact beneath the particular tract, that their grant
amounts to an interest in the land."
The above quotation fairly represents the entire argument of the
court in this case. It will be noted that in comparing these sub-
stances to solid minerals the court says "the purchaser of them
within the ground assumes the hazard of their absence through
the possibility of their escape, just as the purchaser of solid min-
eral within the ground incurs the risk of its absence and, therefore,
a futile venture." Herein lies the vice of the whole argument.
Whilp it is true that the purchaser of solid minerals assumes the
risk of whether there are any such under the land, he does not
assume the risk of their departing from the land after he has pur-
chased, and this without his will or consnt. The purchaser of solid
minerals under a tract of land gets absolute title, which cannot be
lawfully taken away from him by any means whatsoever, to such
minerals as are under the land at the time of conveyance. On the
other hand, the purchaser of oil and gas in sitn may take nothing,
noiwithstanding at the time of the conveyance there were rich de-
posits of these substances under the land. If he should buy the miii-
erals under a narrow strip of land in a proven oil field, with num-
erous wells drilled thereafter adjacent to the strip, and should
drill no wells on the strip, he would find that all claim of title
which he had secured to the minerals under the strip was lost to
him by the oil being brought to the surface through wells on adja-
cent lands. Therefore, what he gets in the conveyance of solid
minerals is vastly different from what he gets in a purported con-
veyance of these fluid minerals. Again, the fact that these sub-
stances are minerals and that while in a tract of land they form a
a part of the bulk of the land, proves nothing in regard to this
question of ownership or their capability of conveyance. Under
the authorities percolating water is a mineral; it is in the land and
forms a part of its bulk while there, and yet there is no respect-
able authority which holds that running water is susceptible of
conveyance. All legal ideas or concepts of the transfer of a piece
of property by sale are based in the idea that the property exists
at the time and can be identified and delivered. Moving oil and
gas cannot be identified, nor can the specific oil and gas which are
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under a tract of land at a given moment be delivered. If one se-
cures the right to produce oil and gas from a tract of land, he
secures the right to produce and own, after reduction to possession,
not only the oil and gas in the land at the time of the conveyance,
but such as may come therein after the conveyance, which comes
in from other tracts of land in which the grantor had no interest.
It may be true that the instrument under consideration in the
Texas Company-Daugherty Case passed an interest in land, and it
may have passed a higher or a different interest from that which
passes by the ordinary agricultural or urban lease. The fact is,
if we must give the character of estate which passed by the instru-
ment a name, taken from the common law nomenclature, we must
class it as the estate well known at common law as profit a prendre.
This was the right to take and abstract the minerals from land
without impeachment for waste; it was a species of lease, but a
lease without impeachment for waste. This. was an estate well
known and recognized at common law, but nobody ever supposed
that the title to even solid minerals in place passed to the owner of
the profit by the execution of this character of instrument.6 2 .
The authorities which the court cites in support of its conclusion
are meagre and inconclusive, and in part do not sustain the state-
ments in the opinion. In referring to the case of Ohio OR Co. v.
Indiana,"3 the court states, "It was pointed out in that case that
the analogy between deposits of oil and gas and things ferae natit-
rae is, at best, a limited one." This is true, but the court goes on
to state that "the difference between them is that things ferae na-
tzrae are public property and all have an equal right to reduce
them to possession and ownership, while the right to the oil and gas
beneath his land is an exclusive and private property right in the
land owner, inhering in virtue of his proprietorship of the land,
and of which he may not be deprived without a taking of private
property." Now, in the first place, no one has the right to go on
my land and take wild animals, and if he does so as a tres-
passer such animals belong to me, the owner of the land. In the
second place, as has been shown, the owner of the land may be
deprived of the oil and gas underlying the same by wells drilled
on adjoining tracts, and thus he may be deprived of what the
court assumes to have been his private property. The court then
quotes from Thornton on Oil and Gas, Section 19. As has been
shown herein this author, in an addendum to his first work, has
U TiFFANY, REAL PROPEITY, (2nd ed.) Vol 2, p. 1388, and authorities collected.
63 Note i, supra.
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stated the doctrine of non-ownership as being established. The
court also quotes from Gould on Water, wherein it is distinctly
stated: "Like water, it is not the subject of property except while
in actual occupancy, and a grant of either water or oil is not a
grant of the soil or of anything for which ejeetment will lie; the
same is true of natural gas."
The case of Stoughton's Appeal, 64 referred to in preceding por-
tions of this paper shows the confusion on this question which
existed in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and much later cases
than Stoughton's Appeal, referred to herein, seem to overrule that
decision. The same may be said of Blakely v. Marshall,65 and the
quotation is evidently not the meat of the decision in that case, be-
cause the question there was whether a life tenant had the right to
lease the land. There is also a quotation from Heller v. Dailey.
The. quotation itself shows that the Indiana court holds to the doc-
trine of non-ownership. The early cases from West Virginia are
quoted, but these cases really hold that a guardian has not the au-
thority to make an oil lease on land without an order of the court,
and these cases have been really overruled, in so far as any expres-
sions tending to show that such a lease was a sale of the minerals in
place, by Harvey Coal and Coke Co. v. Dillon.6 7 Then cases in
Illinois are referred to; and if the doctrine of non-ownership is
anywhere settled, it is in that State.
On the whole, as before stated, it is respectfully submitted that
the decision in this case of Texas Co. v. Daugherty is unsound.
Doubtless the loose decisions in many jurisdictions on this ques-
tion proceed from the fact that the court considered that by an
attempted transfer or conveyance of the minerals the grantee got
all that he would get whether the instrument is deemed a convey-
ance or as a transfer of the right to enter on the land and produce
the minerals, and that, therefore, the question was not very mate-
rial. The establishing of the doctrine of absolute ownership is
fraught with many consequences and will lead to many complica-
tions. For instance, it is universally held that if the owner of land
grants the solid minerals therein, that his constructive possession
as to such minerals ceases and, therefore, limitation ceases to run
in his favor, and if his title had not matured at the time of the
severance or conveyance, then the owner of the paramount title
" 88 Pa. St. 198 (1878).
w' 174 Pa. 425, 34 AtI. 564 (1896).
60 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N. E. 490 (1902).
61 59 W. Va. 605, 53 S. E. 928 (1905).
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could recover the minerals from him, although the right to recover
the land itself is barred.
Again, in a case, such as was presented to the court in Texas
Company v. Daug7herty, called there a defeasible fee estate, or an
estate upon condition, if, after making such a conveyance, the
land is levied upon on execution and sold, the purchaser would get
no title to the minerals, and then if the supposed estate of the
grantee was lost by failure to perform a condition subsequent, this
title would revert to and be in the original grantor and not in the
purchaser at execution sale. The same would be true in case of a
sale by a guardian or by an administrator, or under a deed with-
out warranty made by the land owner after the execution of the
purported deed to the minerals.
Other complications in land titles will occur to others. It is,
therefore, of great importance that this question should be settled,
and settled rightly.
The court in the Daug7herty-Texas Company Case recognizes the
fugacious character of oil and gas, and recognizes the fact that
although oil and gas may be in or under a tract of land at the time
of the purported conveyance, they may leave such land and go
into other tracts of land before they are reduced to possession by
the purported grantee, and that by this migration, as it were, the
title of the land owner or grantee of the minerals is lost against
his will and consent. This being so, the asserted claim of ownership
will not bear examination, because there cannot be such a thing as
unqualified ownership in property if the title thereto can be lost
against the purported owner's consent, especially by the act of
another. The supreme test of ownership or full title is whether a
claimant has such right to the thing as that it cannot be taken from
him lawfully without his consent. If A had the undisputed right
to capture and kill cattle while on his land, but had no right or
power to prevent such cattle from going away from his land, and
that on going from his land all his title to the cattle was lost, no
one could say that he was the absolute owner of such cattle. And
yet, this is exactly the relation that the land owner has to oil and
gas underlying his land.
I think I cannot better conclude this paper than by quoting
from an article written by Professor James W. Simonton, in the
West Virginia Law Quarterly, for June, 1921.
"In conclusion, it is submitted that on principle the land-
owner ought to be held to have no property in substance of -a
fugitive nature merely because they happen to be on, over or
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within his land for the time being; that while he has no property
in these substances themselves while in the state of nature, he
does have an exclusive right on his own land to reduce them
to his control and thus acquire a personal property interest in
the portion he has thus brought within his control; that this
right to reduce to control is an incorporeal property right inci-
dent to the ownership of the land but the ownership of such
right may by proper conveyance be separated from the prop-
erty in the rest of the land. Among the substances which possess
this fugitive nature are waters in streams both above and be-
low the surface, percolating waters, air, oil and gas. The law as
to air and as to water in both surface streams and underground
streams is settled substantially in accord with the principle above
stated. There is confusion in the law as to the landowner's
rights in wild animals, percolating waters and oil and gas, but-
in no jurisdiction has the landowner been allowed the absolute
title in these substances, for no court has held that a landowner
has title to such substances after they have passed from his
land. There is no possible reason for distinguishing percolat-
ing waters from the water in underground streams and it is
difficult to see how there could be any distinction as to oil and
gas. While there are courts which hold that the landowner has
title to oil and gas in place, the law seems to be settled that he
cannot protect his title, if they pass from his land to other land
and therefore the landowner has been thus deprived of the most
important attribute of ownership and of the only advantage
he can derive from such theory. The result is that even in
these jurisdictions the landowner does not own these minerals in
place because he loses title if they leave his land without his
consent. While in some jurisdictions it has been held that the
landowner has a qualified property in oil and gas in place, this
theory cannot be supported on principle and it is doubtful
whether the courts in such jurisdictions mean more than that the
landowner has a right on his own land to take the minerals. A
substantial body of authority has adopted the theory that the
landowner has no property in these minerals in place but has
the exclusive right to reduce them to possession on his own
land. This it is submitted, is sound on principle and is sup-
ported by the analogies as to water in surface and underground
streams, as to air, and by a very respectable body of authority
as to percolating waters and wild animals."
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